A seed-stage company raises $3M. Founders hold 85%, angels 15%. Two offers arrive in the same week. Synthetic numbers, real mechanics.

The two offers

Term Term sheet A Term sheet B
Pre-money valuation $9M $12M
Investor stake 25.0% 20.0%
Option pool 10% of post-money, carved out of pre-money 10% of post-money, carved out of pre-money
Liquidation preference 1x, non-participating 1.5x, participating
Anti-dilution Broad-based weighted average Full ratchet
Board 2 founders, 1 investor 2 founders, 2 investors, 1 independent approved by the investor
Investor veto Standard list: new senior shares, sale, charter changes Standard list, plus budget, senior hires and any new financing
Drag-along Board, preferred majority and common majority Preferred majority alone, after three years, at any price

Term sheet B pays a third more for the company.

What the founders own, and what they receive

Term sheet A Term sheet B
Founders after the round 55.3% 59.5%
Founders receive at a $15M sale $8.3M $6.2M
Founders receive at a $40M sale $22.1M $21.1M
Founders receive at a $100M sale $55.3M $56.8M
Founders after a down round* 35.6% 31.0%

*Next round: $4M at $8M pre-money.

What the numbers say

B wins only above a $63M sale. The participating preference returns $4.5M to the investor first, and the investor then shares in the rest. Against 59.5% of the full sale price, that takes about $2.7M from the founders at every exit above $4.5M. The extra 4.2 points of ownership make up for it only above $63M. At a $15M sale the investor in B holds 20% of the company and takes 44% of the proceeds.

The ratchet reverses the valuation. In B the founders start 4.2 points ahead. After one down round they are 4.6 points behind. Without the ratchet, the seed investor in B would fall from 20% to 13.3%. With it, the investor rises to 25% without investing another dollar. The extra shares dilute everyone else: founders, angels and the option pool.

B gives the investor a hold over the next round. With a veto on new financing, the seed investor can block any round it does not like and use that block in the negotiation. The board gives the founders no majority to push back. The seed investor holds all the preferred shares, so after year three it can trigger the drag-along alone and sell the company at a price that returns its preference and little else.

What I would take to the table

I would go back to B with a lower valuation and ask for three changes.

  1. The preference. 1x non-participating. Fallback: participation capped at 2x.
  2. The ratchet. Broad-based weighted average.
  3. Control. Remove the veto on new financing and budget. Make the independent director mutually agreed. Tie the drag-along to board approval and a minimum price.

What to give in return is the valuation. Keep A’s terms and move the pre-money to $10M. At the $15M and $40M exits modelled here, the founders receive more than under B. Only above roughly $102M does B pull ahead.

The higher valuation is the headline. The terms are the price.

Model inputs: 10M shares before the round, founders 8.5M, angels 1.5M. $3M raised. Option pool 10% of post-money, carved out of pre-money, treated as fully issued and sharing in sale proceeds. The seed investor holds all preferred shares. Exit figures assume no further rounds. Down round: $4M at $8M pre-money, including anti-dilution shares.